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Part I.  Introduction. 
Over the past quarter century the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) has emerged from the 
backwater of federal jurisprudence to become the pre-eminent weapon foreign nationals wield in 
asserting human rights claims.1 Not surprisingly, many such plaintiffs have targeted multi-
national corporations (MNCs).2 The reasons for this address both the substantive issues of 
human rights claims and matters of procedural practicality.  As to the former, they include the 
following:  MNCs have the deep pockets to compensate alleged injuries; their name brands 
provide the publicity necessary to attract international attention;3 and their overseas operations 
are generally the locus and the raison d’être for the alleged wrongs.   
 
1 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350.  Originally adopted as part of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, the act now provides: “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”  The ATCA went largely unused for about 190 years until Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), when the Second Circuit held that the ATCA supported a 
private cause of action for official acts of torture.  Filartiga effectively threw open the doors to 
the federal courts for foreign human rights litigants. 
2 See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International 
Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, n.1 (1999) (defining MNC as a “private 
commercial enterprise that owns or controls production or service facilities outside the country in 
which it is based,” and encompasses commercial activity conducted by a foreign subsidiary, 
foreign branch and joint ventures).  See also PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
AND THE LAW 12-14 (1995); D. Kokkini-Iatridou & P.J.I.M. de Waart, Foreign Investments in 
Developing Countries – Legal Personality of Multinationals in International Law, 14 NETH. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 87 (1983), cited in id. 
3 See Malin Käll, Oil-Exploration in Nigeria: Procedures Addressing Human Rights Abuses, in 1
EXPANDING THE HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 193, 217 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2005) 
(“Victims from the region [in Nigeria] and engaged NGOs were not satisfied with seeking 
redress in national courts, but also tried to gain international attention.  Suits were filed in U.S. 
courts, communications were sent to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
and contacts established with the international community. . .  .  The plaintiffs [in Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.] alleged that corporate defendants’ conduct had violated international and 
common law and that the violations were actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act.”); 
Earthrights International, Press Release: Historic Advance for International Human Rights: 
Unocal to Compensate Burmese Villagers, 
http://www.earthrights.org/news/press_unocal_settle.shtml (last visited October 17, 2005) (“John 
Doe IX, a plaintiff who had done back-breaking forced labor in the mid 1990’s, said, ‘I don’t 
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The procedural reasons, while perhaps not as obvious, are equally compelling.  First, 
many victims of violence done by their own government are unlikely or incapable of seeking 
justice in their home countries.  Second, there is often a “jurisdictional lacuna”, a gap, in 
international law where the law of the MNC’s home country cannot reach and the law of the host 
country does not wish to disturb.4 The “MNC has transcended national legal systems and 
ignored the feeble international system to make the imposition of human rights norms nearly 
impossible.”5 The ATCA succeeds in filling this gap by providing both federal jurisdiction and a 
cause of action for violations of international customary law.  As far as providing a forum for 
validating human rights claims against private actors,6 the ATCA is the only game in town.  
Third, certain defenses available to ATCA defendants (e.g., personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens, the act of state doctrine,7 the doctrine of international comity,8 the political question 
 
care about the money.  Most of all I wanted the world to know what Unocal did.  Now you 
know.’”). 
4 Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating International 
Law, 4 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 86 (1999). 
5 Daniel Aguirre, Multinational Corporations and the Realisation of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 53, 57 (2004).  See also Deltev F. Vagts, The 
Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739 
(1969). 
6 As will be explained below in the Kadic case, the ATCA bucks the general rule that 
international law only applies to state actors. 
7 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“[T]he courts of one country will not sit 
in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”). See also 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The act of state doctrine in its 
traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the 
public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.”); W.S. 
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990) (finding that 
application of the doctrine requires a balancing of interests and that it should not be invoked if 
the policies underlying the doctrine do not justify its application); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 
F.3d 440, 451 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the court’s own gloss on the doctrine in finding error in 
the district court’s invocation of the doctrine to abstain from hearing a claim brought under the 
ATCA); see also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694 (1976) 
(allocating the burden of proof to defendants to justify application of the doctrine).  But see 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t would be a rare case in which the act of 
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doctrine,9 foreign sovereign immunity,10 and head-of-state immunity11) often result in the foreign 
government party being dismissed from the case leaving the MNC as the only available 
defendant.12 Consequently, liability flows past the foreign government and the MNC is left 
holding the proverbial bag.   
 
state doctrine precluded suit under section 1350.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (doubting whether the actions of a state official in violation of its country’s 
constitution and laws, and unratified by its government, could be characterized as an act of state, 
in an ATCA suit alleging torture); The Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (“[N]o 
court in the United States  shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make 
a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in 
which a claim . . . is asserted . . . based upon . . . a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 
1959 . . . [unless] the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required 
in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States . . . .”).  See generally 
Elliott E. Cheatham & Harold G. Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22 VAND. L. 
REV. 27, 88 (1968) (relating the act of state doctrine to the principle of sovereign immunity). 
8 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2782 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
9 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 
(2004) (recognizing the serious weight federal courts should give to the Executive Branch’s view 
of the case’s impact on foreign policy); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(applying the Baker factors to hold that action brought under the ATCA and TVPA was not 
precluded by the political question doctrine).  But see Mujica v. Occidental, 381 F. Supp. 2d 
1164, 1191-96 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (barring action on grounds of the political question doctrine); 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (barring action on grounds of political 
question doctrine).  See generally Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush 
Administrations Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004). 
10 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. (2005); 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that any 
grant of jurisdiction under the ATCA for actions against foreign sovereign nations was 
superseded or preempted by the limiting provisions of the FSIA); H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 5 
(2005) (stating that the TVPA is subject to the restrictions of the FSIA). 
11 See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F.Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 
(2d Cir. 1988) (passage of FSIA leaves scope of head-of-state immunity uncertain). 
12 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in pt., rev’d in pt., 395
F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed,
403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the military government of Burma and its state-owned 
company, which was engaged in a joint-venture with the MNC defendants for the construction of 
a gas pipeline, were entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to the FSIA because the claims of 
civil rights abuses did not fall within the commercial activity exception and dismissing them as 
defendants because they were not necessary and indispensable parties within the meaning of 
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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That is not to suggest that MNCs are ignorant of the social and political context in which 
their foreign companies operate, especially in the extraction and agricultural industries.  Yet, 
MNCs’ foreign operations are often encouraged if not explicitly approved by the United States’ 
legislative and executive branches.  This puts an interesting counter-majoritarian twist on the 
way federal courts have sought to assign civil liability to MNCs through the ATCA. 
 This paper seeks to elucidate the fundamental sources of ATCA jurisprudence that have 
modernized the act into the weapon it has become for foreign human rights plaintiffs.  It also 
attempts to describe some of the forms of liability asserted against MNCs, paying special 
attention to the competing forms of aiding & abetting liability as conceptualized in the Unocal 
case.  For a broader history and description of ATCA case law, there exists a wealth of books 
and articles on the subject.13 Part II of this paper will provide a brief and concise review of the 
three cases every ATCA corporate defendant should know:  Filartiga, Kadic and Sosa.14 These 
cases lay the groundwork for human rights litigation against MNCs under the ATCA’s modern 
epoch.  Part III will address the state-action requirement, for both the ATCA and the Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA).15 It is the initial hurdle for every litigant and there are 
various methods for either overcoming it or simply avoiding it entirely depending on which tort-
 
13 See generally LINDA A. WILLET, MICHELE S. SUGGS & M. ALEXIS PENNOTTI, THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (2003); GARY CLYDE 
HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING THE MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE OF 1789 (2003); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction Over Alien’s Action 
for Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. 
FED. 387 (2005); James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Torture 
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 Note, 199 A.L.R. FED. 389 (2005); Tracy 
Bishop Holton, Cause of Action to Recover Civil Damages Pursuant to the Law of Nations 
and/or Customary International Law, 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 327 (2005). 
14 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). 
15 28 U.S.C. §1350 note § 2(a) (2005). 
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claim is asserted.  Finally, Part IV will address the methods by which MNCs are held liable as 
aiders and abettors of foreign government tortfeasors. 
Part II.  Laying the Groundwork. 
 Filartiga, Kadic and Sosa provide the background necessary to appreciate where MNCs 
stand in the modern epoch of the ATCA.  Each case marked a significant development in the 
jurisprudence of MNC liability under the ATCA.  Filartiga held that an act of official torture 
constituted a violation of the law of nations and that individuals committing such acts abroad 
under State authority could be held liable in the United States under the ATCA.16 Kadic held, 
perhaps more remarkably, that private actors may be held liable under the ATCA for violating 
the law of nations even when not acting under the auspices of a State.  Finally, Sosa, for the most 
part maintained the status quo for ATCA jurisprudence, but sent a stern admonition to the lower 
courts not to get too relaxed in their determinations of what constitutes a violation of the law of 
nations. 
A. Filartiga v. Peña-Irala 
Filartiga has been heralded as the case that kicked open the doors of the federal 
courthouse for international human rights claims.17 Prior to Filartiga, the ATCA was a “legal 
Lohengrin,”18 unfamiliar and rarely invoked.19 Yet since, the Act has attained the peak of 
 
16 See generally Beth Stevens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law 
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(2002). 
17 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (“[W]e believe it is sufficient here to construe the [ATCA], not as 
granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the 
rights already recognized by international law.”). 
18 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“no one seems to know whence it 
came”). 
19 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887; Id. at 888 n.21 (citing Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D. Md. 
1961) (finding ATCA jurisdiction over child custody suit between aliens where falsified passport 
supplied the international law violation); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 Fed. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) 
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notoriety, equally reviled as it is praised, and used with increasing frequency by human rights 
plaintiffs for an ever-expanding list of international law violations. Viewed narrowly, the 
Filartiga case recognized official torture as a violation of the law nations such that district courts 
would have jurisdiction under the ATCA.  Viewed broadly, as most human rights plaintiffs and 
activists prefer to, Filartiga provided that a State’s treatment of its own citizens could create a 
human rights oriented private cause of action under the ATCA; it meant that an alien could sue a 
private individual for an international law violation as long as the act was perpetrated under the 
color of official authority.  Most significantly, perhaps, Filartiga freed the ATCA from its 
eighteenth century moorings by holding that “the constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is 
the law of nations, which has always been part of the federal common law”20 and “courts must 
interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the 
nations today.”21 
Circuit Judge Irving Kaufman wrote the opinion, reversing the district court’s dismissal 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  He held “that deliberate torture perpetrated under color of 
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights.”22 
The plaintiffs’ allegations, though startling, are not unfamiliar.  Dr. Filartiga and his daughter, 
citizens of Paraguay residing in the U.S., alleged that Pena-Irala, who was at the time Inspector 
General of the Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, kidnapped, tortured and murdered the doctor’s son 
 
(finding ATCA jurisdiction over suit to determine title to slaves found on board an enemy vessel 
taken on the high seas)). 
20 Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 885. 
21 Id. at 881.  See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F. 2d 421, 425 (2d. 
Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (“Evolving standards of international 
law govern who is within the [ATCA’s] jurisdictional grant.”). 
22 Id. at 878. 
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in retaliation for the father’s political activities.23 Subsequently, Dr. Filartiga commenced a 
criminal action in Paraguay against Pena and the police.  Unfortunately, Filartiga’s lawyer was 
arrested by Pena, shackled to a wall at police headquarters, threatened with death and eventually 
disbarred.  Forum non conveniens, indeed.  Plaintiffs sought $10 million in compensatory and 
punitive damages for wrongful death and torture and claimed jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
 The primary issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA required it to be 
determined whether the acts alleged by the Filartigas violated the law of nations.24 Kaufman 
analyzed the issue first, as to the rules applied in ascertaining international law and second, as to 
the evidence that official torture was indeed prohibited by the law of nations. 
 In ascertaining the sources of international law, Kaufman looked first to the Supreme 
Court.  In United States v. Smith, the Court stated: “the law of nations ‘may be ascertained by 
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and 
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’”25 The Smith 
Court found in the writings of Lord Bacon, Grotius and Bochard a consensus rendering piracy 
“‘sufficiently and constitutionally defined.’”26 In The Paquete Habana, the Court had held that 
the works of jurists and commentators might be used as evidence of the “‘customs and usages of 
civilized nations’” “‘where there is no treaty, controlling executive or legislative act, or judicial 
decision.’”27 Judge Kaufman cited the Statute of the International Court of Justice as reaffirming 
 
23 Id. 
24 The plaintiffs did not allege the conduct arose under a treaty of the United States.  Id. at 880. 
25 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820)). 
26 Id. (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. at 162). 
27 Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), cited with approval in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766-67 (2004)).  
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this standard.28 Furthermore, Habana announced the requirement that what was formerly only a 
standard may ripen into a binding rule of international law by ‘the general assent of civilized 
nations,’”29 and therefore “courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it 
has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”30 
Judge Kaufman proceeded to explicate the various sources in which evidence of the 
international prohibition against torture could be found, namely: international conventions, 
writings of commentators, national law and U.S. policy.  He began with the United Nations 
Charter for the principle that “a state’s treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international 
concern.”31 The Charter stated that the UN “‘shall promote universal . . . observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’” with its members pledging to take “‘joint and separate 
action’” in order to achieve this purpose.32 Evidence of the right to be free from torture as being 
one such “human right and fundamental freedom” was found in two important U.N. declarations.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated, “‘no one shall be subjected to torture.’”33 
The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture prohibited any 
state from permitting torture.  It expressly defined torture as “‘any act by which severe pain and 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public 
 
28 Id. at 881 (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055 (1945) (in deciding in accordance with international law, the ICJ shall apply international 
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and 
judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists)). 
29 Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694). 
30 Id. See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 198 (1796) (distinguishing between “ancient” and 
“modern” law of nations). 
31 Id. at 881. 
32 Id. (quoting U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945)). 
33 Id. at 882 (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 5, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)).  In a subsequent resolution, 
the General Assembly “declared that the Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration 
‘constitute basic principles of international law.’”  Id. 
MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
 10
official on a person for such purposes as’” obtaining information or a confession, as punishment, 
or as intimidation.34 Further evidence was found in several other international treaties.  The 
American Convention on Human Rights stated, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.’”35 This principle was echoed in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.36 
Kaufman found relevant the writings of several commentators as well.  For instance, one 
such commentator cited by the court found that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “‘no 
longer fits into the dichotomy of binding treaty against non-binding pronouncement, but is rather 
an authoritative statement of the international community.’”37 Other commentators concluded 
the declaration has become a part of “binding, customary international law.”38 Yet another 
pointed to states themselves as evidence of an international law, saying the “‘best evidence for 
the existence of international law is that every actual State recognizes that it does exist and that it 
is itself under an obligation to observe it.’”39 
Finally, Judge Kaufman found evidence of the international prohibition against torture in 
national laws and U.S. policy.  He cited a survey that stated that torture was implicitly or 
 
34 Id. at 883 (quoting Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to 
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, at 30, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. DOC A/1034 (1975)). 
35 Id. (quoting Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123). 
36 Id. at 884. 
37 Id. at 883 (quoting E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 
(1964)). 
38 Id. (citing Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19
HARV. INT’L L.J. 813, 816-17 (1978); Waldlock, Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law and the Significance of the European Convention, INT’L & COMP. L.Q., SUPP. PUBL. NO. 11, 
1965, at 15). 
39 Id. at 884 n.15 (quoting J. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (Oxford 
1944)). 
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expressly prohibited by the constitutions of over fifty-five nations, including the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article Forty-Five of the Constitution of Paraguay.40 
Furthermore, U.S. foreign policy expressly promoted the principle that “international law confers 
fundamental rights upon all people vis-à-vis their own governments.”41 Sections of title twenty-
two of the United States Code declared that “‘no security assistance may be provided to any 
country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights’” and that “‘the individual liberties, economic 
prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a 
community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms.’”42 
Judge Kaufman ultimately concluded, based upon his examination of the previously 
described sources from which customary international law is derived, that official torture is 
prohibited by the law of nations.  Consequently, the ATCA may provide federal jurisdiction for a 
private cause of action alleging official torture. 
 In the remainder of the opinion, Judge Kaufman contended with several subsidiary 
arguments advanced by the respondent, including whether federal jurisdiction under the ATCA 
was consistent with Article III of the Constitution.  Kaufman ultimately found that the Act was 
constitutional in its grant of federal jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court had held that a case arises 
under the laws of the United States for Article III purposes if it is either grounded upon federal 
statute or United States common law.43 After a review of the history of the Constitution and its 
relationship with international law at the time of its framing, Kaufman concluded that the law 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 885. 
42 Id. at 885 n.17 (quoting 22 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2151(a)). 
43 Id. at 886 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972)). 
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nations became part of the common law of the United States upon the adoption of the 
Constitution.  Thus, the ATCA was authorized by Article III. 
In arriving at that decision, Kaufman acknowledged as undisputed the fact that domestic 
state courts could hear claims for torts committed overseas, as long as the act was unlawful 
where performed.  The parties agreed that here, where personal jurisdiction has been obtained, 
“the acts alleged would violate Paraguayan law, and the policies of the forum are consistent with 
the foreign law, state court jurisdiction would be proper.”44 In describing what federal policies 
were consistent with foreign law, Judge Kaufman stated, “the conduct alleged here [i.e. police 
torture in violation of national law] would be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . if performed 
by a government official.”45 This statement provided an early indication of what standard the 
courts would employ in determining whether the alleged international law violation occurred 
under the color of official authority, thus satisfying the general state-action requirement under 
international law.  However, there is something counter-intuitive in grafting this standard onto 
the ATCA.  Under domestic tort actions, section 1983 is used to attribute the conduct of an 
individual to the state, yet under the ATCA, section 1983 is used to attribute the conduct of the 
state, i.e. a state actor, to a private individual, where as here, Filartiga is seeking compensation 
from Pena-Irala, not Asuncion, Paraguay.   
B.  Kadic v. Karadzic & The Genocide Exception 
 In reversing the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Second Circuit in Kadic did something that Scalia would later call “truly remarkable”.46 It 
disregarded Congress’ explicit instructions and held that a private cause of action for genocide 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 885 n.18. 
46 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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and war crimes existed under the ATCA, and that such claims may apply against a private actor 
in his private capacity without a showing of State action.  I shall refer to this loophole in 
international law, a law that generally applies only to State actors, 47 as the “genocide exception.”  
In so holding, the Kadic court was expanding upon Judge Edwards’s observation in Tel-Oren 
that there are a “handful of crimes” including piracy and slave trading, “to which the law of 
nations attributes individual liability,” such that state action is not required.48 Furthermore, the 
Kadic court applied a “color of law” standard in order to hold that the private actor defendant 
may be found liable under the ATCA and the TVPA in his capacity as a state actor for additional 
international law violations that did require official action. 
 In Kadic, several aliens sued Radovan Karadzic, leader of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-
Serb republic of “Srpska” (which exercised actual control, and claimed lawful authority, over 
parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina).49 The plaintiffs, Croat-Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(formerly Yugoslavia) alleged they were victims of various atrocities committed by Bosnian-
Serb military forces during the Bosnian civil war.50 Plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic directed the 
military forces while acting in an official capacity as either head of the unrecognized state of 
Srpska or as collaborator acting in concert with the recognized Serbian Republic of the former 
Yugoslavia.51 The plaintiffs asserted several causes of action under both the ATCA and the 
 
47 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769) (“Offenses 
against [the law of nations are] principally incident to whole states or nations.”) quoted in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2756 (2004). 
48 Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 240 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 795 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).  The Ninth Circuit fully adopted the Second Circuit’s 
exceptions for ATCA liability without regard to state action in its infamous Unocal decision.  
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3d 932, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 
49 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236-37. 
50 Id. at 237. 
51 Id. 
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TVPA, namely: genocide, rape, forced prostitution and impregnation, torture, assault and battery, 
sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death.52 
With regard to its first holding creating the genocide exception, the Kadic court examined 
two issues:  first, “whether some violations of the law of nations may be remedied when 
committed by those not acting under the authority of a state,”53 and second, “whether genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity are among the violations that do not require state 
action.”54 In carving out its exception, the court discussed a “substantial body of law” in order to 
hold that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting 
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.”55 
The court offered as its first example of the application of the law of nations against 
private individuals the prohibition against piracy.56 The Supreme Court had gone so far as to call 
pirates the “‘hostis humani generis’ (an enemy of all mankind) . . . because they acted ‘without . 
. . any pretense of public authority.’”57 Later examples include the prohibition against the slave 
trade and the prohibition against certain war crimes.58 
Having established piracy, slave trade and war crimes as international law violations not 
requiring state action, the court then stated that the Executive Branch had itself recognized the 
ATCA as an available remedy against private individuals.  First, Attorney General Bradford in 
 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 236. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 239. 
56 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 
184, 196-97 (1820)). 
57 Id. (quoting The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844)).  The court also refers the reader 
to 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (Univ. of Chi. ed. 
1979). 
58 Id. (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 193 (1992); Jourdan Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights 
Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51 (1992)). 
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1795 approved of an ATCA remedy in reference to the plunder of British property by American 
citizens off the coast of Sierra Leone.59 Second, the current administration, in a Statement of 
Interest addressed to the Kadic court, asserted that private persons could be liable under the 
ATCA for “acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian 
law.”60 
Next, the court pointed out that the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States declares that “‘[i]ndividuals may be held liable for offenses against 
international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.’”61 The Restatement carefully 
distinguishes between international law violations that are actionable when committed by a 
state62 and those that are of “universal concern.”63 The former include genocide, slavery or slave 
trade, the murder or disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.64 The latter 
include violations a state may punish “without regard to territoriality or the nationality of the 
offenders.”65 Violations of “universal concern” include piracy, genocide, war crimes, slave 
trade, hijacking of aircraft, and “perhaps certain acts of terrorism . . . .”66 The court stated that 
the inclusion of piracy and aircraft hijacking demonstrates that “offenses of ‘universal concern’ 
 
59 Id. (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)). 
60 Id. at 239-40. 
61 Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. pt.II, intro. 
note (1986)). 
62 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702 (1986)). 
63 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404 (1986)). 
64 Id. at 240 n.3 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 702 
(1986)). 
65 Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402(1)(a), 
(2) (1986)). 
66 Id. at 240 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404 
(1986)). 
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include those capable of being committed by non-state actors”67 and that international law 
authorizes states to apply civil remedies, such as the ATCA.68 
The court then proceeded to determine whether genocide, war crimes and torture and 
summary execution, as alleged by the plaintiffs, are causes of action that may be asserted against 
a private individual under the ATCA.  In support of its holding that genocide is such a violation, 
the court cited the United Nations as authority.  First, the United Nations declared that “genocide 
is a crime under international law . . . whether the perpetrators are ‘private individuals, public 
officials or statesman.’”69 The United Nations also affirmed Article 6 of the Agreement and 
Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal where those who persecuted on 
political, racial or religious grounds may be punished regardless of whether they acted as 
individuals or members of organizations.70 The United Nation’s Convention on Genocide, 
ratified by the United States in 1989, gives a specific definition of genocide and applies liability 
for violation of its prohibition against constitutionally responsible leaders, public officials, and 
private individuals.71 
It is at this point that the court did something “truly remarkable.”72 First, it indicated that 
the Genocide Convention Implementation Act criminalizes genocide regardless of whether the 
 
67 Id. at 240. 
68 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 404 cmt. b 
(1986)).  The court also highlighted the fact that the only two cases invoking the ATCA prior to 
Filartiga asserted liability against private actors.  See Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp 857 (D. Md. 
1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). 
69 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (quoting G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188-89, U.N. Doc A/64/Add.1 (1946)). 
70 Id. (citing G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946); In re Extradition of 
Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544, 555 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 1985)). 
71 Id. (citing Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide arts. II, IV, 
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 23, 1989)). 
72 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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offender is a state-actor (i.e., “whoever commits genocide”)73 if it is committed in the United 
States or by an American national.74 It then reiterated the law’s assertion that it not be 
“‘construed as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in 
any proceeding.’”75 Nevertheless, the court held that the ATCA permitted a private remedy for 
acts of genocide for three reasons.  First, it found “the legislative decision not to create a new 
private remedy does not imply that a private remedy is not already available under the 
[ATCA].”76 Second, there was nothing in the law itself or its legislative history suggesting a 
congressional intent to repeal the ATCA as it applied to genocide.  And third, the court found the 
two laws were not repugnant to each other.  Thus, the court held that a cause of action already 
existed under law, i.e., the ATCA, pre-dating the Genocide Convention Implementation Act, and 
so the court did not run afoul of Congress’ intention that no new federal causes of action in civil 
proceedings be created.77 
Although, how the court may use the implementation law to expand or confirm a 
preexisting cause of action under the ATCA as applicable to private individuals when that law 
explicitly denies that it creates any new federal private causes of action is unclear.  That is, if 
genocide existed as a cause of action under the ATCA prior to the implementation law, but was 
not considered actionable against non-state-actors, then the federal implementation law cannot be 
used to expand liability to such actors as it would then be creating a new federal private right of 
action contrary to Congress’ intent.  Indeed, the implementation act’s admonition against 
 
73 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242 (quoting Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1091(a) (1988)). 
74 Id. (citing Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a), (d) 
(1988)). 
75 Id. (quoting Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (1988)). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 242 n.6. 
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creating a private right of action can be construed as forbidding any expansion of existing 
notions of liability for acts of genocide.  Thus, the Kadic court is mistaken to have relied upon 
the implementation act to justify a claim for genocide against non-state-actors, and must fall 
back on the Convention on Genocide itself and the other United Nations sources it has cited. 
The court next held that war crimes (i.e., murder, rape, torture and arbitrary detention of 
civilians committed during hostilities) are actionable against private actors under the ATCA.  
The court cited the Supreme Court as support for the assertion that such atrocities are recognized 
as violations under international law, which imposes an affirmative duty upon commanders to 
prevent them.78 The court then found that under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
the parties to a conflict who are obligated to abide the convention’s requirements of the law of 
war include “insurgent military groups.”79 However, the court fails to explain how it arrived at 
such a conclusion whereby “roving hordes of insurgents”, i.e., anti-state-actors, are to be 
obligated by a treaty which they neither signed nor ratified.  That is, unless the court means to 
imply that such prohibitions against war crimes as existing under the conventions have ripened 
into international customary law according to which both state and non-state actors may be held 
liable.  However, the court simply stated that the “liability of private individuals for committing 
war crimes has been recognized since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World 
War II.”80 It cited only two articles to support this contention.81 
78 Id. at 242 (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946)). 
79 Id. at 243. 
80 Id. 
81 See Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law, 450 INT’L
CONCILIATION 304 (April 1949); Jordan Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes 
Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, in 4 THE VIETNAM WAR AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (R. Falk ed., 1976), cited with approval in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.  See 
also Ann B. Ching, Evolution of the Command Responsibility Doctrine in Light of the Celebici 
Decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
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At this point, what has been implicit in the court’s rationale now becomes explicit.  The 
court is unabashedly blending the concepts on international criminal culpability with domestic 
private law tort liability.  Consequently, private individuals who could be found guilty of 
international crimes may additionally have private actions asserted against them in tort.  The 
elimination of the “just following orders” defense under international criminal law has resulted 
in the elimination of the State-action requirement for genocide and war crimes allegations under 
the ATCA.  Yet, perhaps this result is understandable for two basic reasons.  First, the ATCA 
itself refers only to the “law of nations” which was generally accepted as applicable on to States, 
yet the Act fails to distinguish between public law and private law.  Second, the Supreme Court 
in the Smith case explicitly referred to “the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law”
as a source by which to ascertain the law of nations;82 and criminal law is, after all, a subdivision 
of public law. 
 As for torture and summary execution, the court declined to extend its Filartiga holding 
to include unofficial acts of private individuals.  It maintained that international law proscribed 
 
COM. REG. 167, 167 (1999) (According to the doctrine of superior-subordinate liability “a 
subordinate cannot escape liability merely because he or she was following the orders of a 
superior.”); Id. at n.4 (“The ‘just following orders’ defense was made infamous in the United 
States by the actions of U.S. Army Lieutenant Calley at My Lai during the Vietnam War.”); 
United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973); James McHenry, Justice for Foca: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s Prosecution of Rape and Enslavement as 
Crimes Against Humanity, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 183, 211-12 (2002) (“. . . Article 7 of 
the ICTY statute explicitly considers individual criminal responsibility for acts committed in 
relation to the conflict in Yugoslavia; therefore, the ICTY itself has personal jurisdiction to 
prosecute anyone who may be criminally liable for violations of international law in this setting.  
Furthermore, Article 7(4) expressly prohibits a "just following orders" defense, although it does 
allow such a claim as a mitigating factor.  Moreover, the ICTY's ability to prosecute individuals 
reflects a growing trend in international law to expand the legal personality of individuals.
Finally, the defense of "just following orders," even if it not prohibited by Article 7(4) of the 
ICTY enabling statute, has been rejected soundly by international law since Nuremberg.”) 
(emphasis added). 
82 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820) (emphasis added). 
MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
 20
torture and summary execution only when committed by state officials or under color of law.  
Thus, a non-state actor may be liable for such acts only when perpetrated in the course of 
genocide or war crimes.83 
Having determined that non-state actors could be held liable for genocide or war crimes 
in claims brought under the ATCA (i.e., the genocide exception), the court then explored the 
meaning of the state-action requirement for international law violations in order to determine 
Karadzic’s culpability for torture and summary execution.  First, the court found that the state-
action requirement is satisfied even if the state on whose behalf the act is done is not recognized 
by other states.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States does not 
require a state to be formally recognized by other states as long as it otherwise satisfies the four 
familiar requirements for statehood (i.e., defined territory, permanent population, under the 
control of its own government, and engagement or capacity to engage, in formal relations with 
other states).84 In Ford v. Surget, Justice Clifford stressed that regardless of the wrongfulness of 
a state’s origin, it “‘must be considered a de facto government if it was in the full and actual 
exercise of sovereignty over a territory and people large enough for a nation.”85 Furthermore, 
the court asserted that federal courts “have regularly given effect to the ‘state’ action of 
unrecognized states.  The court cited several cases involving secessionist Civil War era states as 
well as East Germany.86 Additionally, customary international human rights law does not 
 
83 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243-44. 
84 Id. at 244 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 201, 202 
cmt. b (1986); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 720 (1868)). 
85 Id. (quoting Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 620 (1878) (Clifford, J., concurring)). 
86 Id. at 244-45 (citing United States v. Insurance Cos., 89 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1875); Thorington v. 
Smith, 75 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1868); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 699 (2d 
Cir. 1970)). 
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distinguish between recognized and unrecognized states in its application.87 In dictum, the court 
appeared to lower the bar for the traditional Blackstonian requirement of state-action in 
international law where it stated that “it is likely that the state action concept, where applicable 
for some violations like ‘official’ torture, requires merely the semblance of official authority.”88 
Second, the court found that a claim that an individual acted “in concert” with a state is 
sufficient to allege that that individual “acted under color of law” for the purposes of satisfying 
the state-action requirement.89 In so doing, the court declared, “[t]he ‘color of law’ 
jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in 
official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the [ATCA].”90 From whence this “relevant 
guide” came or why it is appropriate for it to be grafted onto international law claims is not 
explained.  The court cited only one case, from a district court in California, for support.91 The 
court then cited Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. for the rule that “[a] private individual acts under 
color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with 
significant state aid.”92 
As for the TVPA, the court simply affirmed what the act itself and its legislative history 
state expressly, namely, that state action is required by way of “actual or apparent authority, or 
 
87 Id. at 245 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 207, 702 
(1986)). 
88 Id. (emphasis added). 
89 C.f. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(a) (“For harm resulting to a third person from the 
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (a) does a tortious act in concert 
with the other or pursuant to a common design  with him . . .”) (emphasis added). 
90 Id. (emphasis added). 
91 Id. (citing Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
92 Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). 
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color of law, of any foreign nation.”93 Congress instructed the courts to construe such terms 
according to principles of agency law and § 1983 jurisprudence, respectively.94 
As a result of Kadic, a private individual or non-state actor may be held liable under the 
ATCA for genocide, war crimes and violations committed in the course of genocide or war 
crimes without proof of state-action.  In order to allege state-action, § 1983 jurisprudence is to be 
applied as a “relevant guide” and a defendant may be liable even if acting “under the color” of a 
de facto or unrecognized state. 
C.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
It took 215 years, but with Sosa, the Supreme Court made its first substantial decision on 
the meaning and scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act.95 In it, the Court finally announced a 
standard for determining what causes of action defendants might be held liable and upon which 
corporate defendants might hopefully rely.  Though long awaited, the decision is not altogether 
unexpected, for with its standard, the Court in effect toed the line by which most courts already 
adhered,96 namely the “specific, universal and obligatory” standard.97 What was surprising, 
 
93 Id. (quoting Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 2(a) (2005). 
94 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 5 (1991)). 
95 See generally Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) 
(holding that no exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act applied to give the district court 
jurisdiction over the Argentine Republic in an action brought by Liberian corporations under the 
ATCA for destruction of oil tanker on high seas in violation of international law); Lynch v. 
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, n.17 (1972) (pointing out that the ATCA is among a 
series of special federal statutes that grant jurisdiction in areas that would otherwise fall under 
the general federal question statute); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) 
(finding that the ATCA indicates a desire by the First Congress to give matters of international 
significance to the jurisdiction of federal courts rather than the states); O’Reilly de Camara v. 
Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1907) (suggesting a cause of action for expropriation of property might 
be cognizable under a predecessor to section 1350, but the question of ATCA jurisdiction 
disposed of “on the merits”). 
96 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 (“The position we take today has been assumed by some federal 
courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala . . . .”). 
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however, was that the Court failed to assert a standard for determining how private actors might 
be liable for a violation requiring state action.  The Court not only left the “door ajar” for new 
causes of action, but for further district court finagling of liability standards by which they could 
keep MNCs in federal court. 
 In Sosa, the Court heard the case of an alien suing a private individual under the ATCA 
for allegedly violating an international law prohibiting arbitrary arrest.  The plaintiff, Humberto 
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican citizen, had previously been acquitted in federal court for the 
murder of a DEA agent in Mexico.  Alvarez now alleged that in order to get him into a U.S. 
court to be tried for the murder the DEA had enlisted several Mexican civilians, including Jose 
Sosa, to seize him and bring him across the border from Mexico to the United States so that 
federal agents could arrest him.  In reversing the Ninth Circuit and granting the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, the Court decided that Alvarez’ single illegal detention of less than one day 
did not violate any norm of international law.  Thus, Alvarez did not have a cause of action for a 
tort “in violation of the law of nations” under the ATCA.   
In arriving at its decision, the Court announced three important limitations on the scope 
of the ATCA.  First, the ATCA is only jurisdictional.  Second, that jurisdiction includes ability to 
enforce a small number of international norms recognized as part of the common law at the time 
 
97 See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. 
Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 
(E.D. La. 1997).  Since the Sosa decision, several courts have retained the “specific, universal 
and obligatory” standard.  See, e.g., Doe v. Liu Qi, 349 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1320-28 (N.D. Cal. 
2004); Doe v. Saravia 348 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2004).  C.f. Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 381 F.Supp.2d 1164, 1177 n.12 (2005) (“While the Supreme Court did not 
expressly disavow the ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ standard, [this] court chooses to 
closely follow the approach provided by Sosa.”). 
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the statute was adopted.  Third, the Court announced a standard for determining what new causes 
of action federal courts might properly recognize as within the Act’s jurisdiction. 
The Court gave three reasons for holding that the ATCA is only a grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The original version of the ATCA passed by the first Congress as part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the federal district courts “shall also have cognizance . . . of 
all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”98 The Sosa Court interpreted “cognizance” as a grant of jurisdiction only, “not 
power to mold substantive law.”99 Furthermore, it found that the purposeful placement of the 
ATCA in § 9 of a statute exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction supports this.  
Third, it recognized that the difference between jurisdiction and cause of action would have been 
fully appreciated by the drafters of the Judiciary Act. 
Next, the Court held that the ATCA was not stillborn, but was intended to permit the 
federal courts to hear a narrow set of federal common law actions that were derived from the law 
of nations.  Subject to a nonexistent congressional record, the Court delved into an analysis of 
the historical circumstances surrounding the drafting of the ATCA, including a brief précis of the 
Marbois Incident of 1784.  The Court concluded that three offenses against the law of nations 
addressed by the criminal law of England were “probably on minds of the men who drafted the 
[ATCA] with its reference to tort.”100 These three offenses are: violation of safe conducts, 
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 
Lastly, the Court announced a restrained standard for determining what new causes of 
action might be asserted by aliens in federal court as a violation of the law of nations.  The 
 
98 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 79. 
99 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.  
100 Id. at 2756. 
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standard is intended to limit federal courts’ discretion in considering claims under the present-
day law of nations as elements of the common law.  Thus, it requires that any such new claims, 
first, “rest on a norm of international character”, second, that norm must be “accepted by the 
civilized world,”101 and third, that norm must be “defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the [three] 18th-century paradigms.”102 The Court added two factors for courts to 
consider: the “practical consequences” of making the new cause of action available in federal 
court,103 and “whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given 
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.”104 
Footnote twenty is the only time the Court made explicit mention of corporations as 
possible ATCA defendants in its opinion.  Unfortunately, the Court failed to approve of any 
particular standard of liability already being utilized by the federal courts in assessing MNC 
liability under the ATCA (e.g., “color of law” liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or aiding & 
abetting liability).  It does, however, seem to suggest that whatever liability standard is 
appropriate for a given norm should be derived from international law rather than domestic law.  
 
101 Does the Court mean by “civilized” the Christian world?  See also The Paquete Habana, 175 
U.S. 677, 694, 700 (1900) (“The word ‘comity’ was apparently used by Lord Stowell as 
synonymous with courtesy or goodwill.  But the period of a hundred years which has since 
elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, 
courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of 
international law…. And the Empire of Japan (the last state admitted into the rank of civilized 
nations), by an ordinance promulgated at the beginning of its war with China in August, 1894, 
established prize courts….) (emphasis added); Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 
38 (“[T]he ICJ shall apply . . . general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
102 As an example of the specificity it requires, the Court cites United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 
153, 163-180, n.a (1820) for an illustration of how the law of nations defined piracy. 
103 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766. 
104 Id. at 2766 n.20 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 2782 (“The norm must extend liability to 
the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue.”) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Disappointingly, the Court appeared in the footnote to implicitly affirm the cognoscibility of 
ATCA claims against MNC defendants.   
Toward the end of the opinion the Court for a second time mentions private actor 
liability.  In rejecting Alvarez’ allegation of arbitrary detention, defined as an officially 
sanctioned action, the Court appeared to reprove Alvarez in that all of his attempts to 
demonstrate that his claim is one of well defined and accepted international customary law 
“assumes that Alvarez could establish that Sosa [a Mexican civilian] was acting on behalf of a 
government when he made the arrest, for otherwise he would need a rule broader still [i.e., one 
not requiring the act to be officially sanctioned].”105 This terse statement suggests that the Court 
approves of holding private actors liable under rules requiring state action.  Although, again, it 
fails to indicate under what standard a private actor might be found to be “acting on behalf of” a 
state.  The Court also seems to have implicitly endorsed Kadic’s “genocide exception” to the 
state-action requirement under the ATCA by saying Sosa may need a “broader rule.”  That 
broader rule is one in which a private actor may be held liable for violating the norm absent 
“officially sanctioned action.” 
Ultimately, “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping and thus open to a 
narrow class of international norms today.”106 The Court noted that its position, i.e., authorizing 
the judicial power to recognize new claims under the law of nations as part of the federal 
common law, had already been assumed by and was consistent with several federal courts since 
 
105 Id. at 2768. 
106 Id. at 2764.  But see id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the door represents the 
common law that was closed by Erie).  Erie, however, only proscribed the application of the 
general law, or the federal common law, by the district courts sitting in diversity actions.  ATCA 
claims raise the hybrid action of federal question and diversity.  And in any case, the district 
court in an ATCA action would not have to choose between state law and general law, as in Erie,
but must rather apply the general law in its most general form, that is, international law.   
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Filartiga.107 Furthermore, this position had never met with Congressional disagreement.108 As a 
result, after Sosa, federal courts continue to enjoy the wide discretion they had since Filartiga,
this time with the Court’s blessing.  Unfortunately, corporate defendants are left as unsure as 
before as to what new causes of actions they may be susceptible to and by what standards their 
liability might be judged.  The trend begun by Filartiga and expanded by Kadic has been 
endorsed by Sosa, and it is sure to continue, possibly for another 200 years. 
 
III.  MNC Liability under the ATCA & TVPA. 
 The Alien Tort Claims Act contains two grants of jurisdiction for foreign tort claimants.  
In 1991, Congress codified and expanded upon Filartiga with the adoption of the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (TVPA) and added it as a note to section 1350.109 Plaintiffs often bring their 
claims under both the ATCA and the TVPA.  Where the ATCA is vague, the TVPA is explicit.  
Where the ATCA is expansive, the TVPA is narrow.  Each has its particular history, rules and 
limitations.  Therefore, when examining the standards by which MNC liability is to be judged, 
each must dealt with separately, at least to begin with. 
A.  The ATCA: State-Action Implied & the Genocide Exception. 
 The Alien Tort Claims Act provides in its entirety that “the district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
 
107 Id. at 2765.  See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 104 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“Filartiga remains the leading case interpreting the ATCA.”).  The Court’s alignment with the 
Filartiga school should come as no surprise considering that in 1996 it denied certiorari for 
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (1995), a case which rested upon and implicitly confirmed the 
principles established by Filartiga.
108 Indeed, Congress approved of the view of Filartiga by enacting the Torture Victim Protection 
Act.  See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991). 
109 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (noting that 
the purposes of TVPA are to codify Filartiga, to alleviate separation of powers concerns, and to 
expand the remedy to include U.S. citizens). 
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law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”110 A plaintiff must satisfy three conditions in 
order to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATCA: (1) plaintiff must be an 
alien (2) suing for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations or U.S. treaty.111 “[I]t is 
not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to plead merely a colorable violation of the law of 
nations.”112 It should be apparent after reading Sosa that the first and often highest hurdle for 
anyone hoping to sue a MNC under the ATCA is alleging a violation of the law of nations that a 
federal court will recognize. 
However, the question of whether MNCs are subject to liability at all under the ATCA 
seems to have been answered in 1997 by the landmark case of Doe v. Unocal Corp.113 For the 
first time a federal district court held that a corporation and its executive officers could be held 
liable under the ATCA for violations of international human rights in a foreign country.114 The 
case is significant for two reasons.  First, “it allowed the plaintiffs to seek damages from a U.S. 
corporation, even if it was only one of several named responsible parties for a violation of the 
 
110 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005). 
111 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 
(1995). 
112 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.  See also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165-69 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (dismissing claims of individual human rights violations under the ATCA on the 
ground that complaint failed to provide “adequate factual specificity”); Dwares v. City of New 
York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We have, of course, repeatedly held that in order to state a 
claim of conspiracy under section 1983 the complaint must contain more than mere conclusory 
allegations. … And while a plaintiff should not plead mere evidence, he should make an effort to 
provide some ‘details of time and place and the alleged effect of the conspiracy.’"). 
113 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in pt., rev’d in pt., 395 F.3d 
932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).  See generally Earthrights International, Resource Center: Doe v. 
Unocal, http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
114 See infra app. I. 
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ATCA.”115 Second, the court “recognized that corporations are viable defendants for plaintiffs 
claiming an ATCA violation.”116 
The case settled in the spring of 2005, ostensibly as a precondition for a merger between 
Unocal and ChevronTexaco.  Shortly afterward, the legal team for the Burmese plaintiffs made 
the following statement: 
[T]his is a historic victory for human rights and for the corporate 
accountability movement.  Corporations can no longer fool 
themselves into thinking they can get away with human rights 
violations.  This case will reverberate in corporate boardrooms 
around the world and will have a deterrent effect on the worst 
forms of corporate behavior.117 
The possibility of the case having a deterrent effect has yet to be determined.  Yet there is 
no doubt that the outcome of the first Unocal judgment emboldened victims of human rights 
violations to seek redress from MNCs in American courts.  Since 1997, the number of ATCA 
suits against MNCs has increased significantly, though none have as yet gone to trial.118 That a 
corporation may be held legally responsible under the ATCA seems to have become a forgone 
conclusion for most judges.119 
Thus, whether it is an individual or an MNC being sued, the ATCA requires that state-
action be alleged (except in certain circumstances).120 This requirement is implied by basic 
principles of international law and federal case law. 
 
115 Armin Rosencranz & David Louk, Doe v. Unocal: Holding Corporations Liable for Human 
Rights Abuses on Their Watch, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 135, 137 (2005). 
116 Id. 
117 Earthrights International, Press Release: Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights: 
Unocal to Compensate Burmese Villagers, 
http://www.earthrights.org/news/press_unocal_settle.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
118 See infra app. I. 
119 The same cannot be said for corporate liability under the TVPA. 
120 See generally Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, The State Action Requirement, 1
LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:12 (2005). 
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It is a general principle that international law applies only to nations.121 Customary 
international law itself, upon which ATCA suits are partly based, is derived from the consistent 
practice of states acting out of a sense of legal obligation.122 Furthermore, the sources and 
evidence of international law, such as treaties or United Nations declarations, speak in terms of 
the responsibilities of states, not individuals.123 For example, Article Thirty-Eight of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice states that the court, in deciding in accordance with 
international law, must apply: “international conventions . . . establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states, international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law, [and] the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations . . . .”124 
Therefore, violations of international law require state action. 
This principle has been adopted in the U.S. and applied to the ATCA through federal case 
law.125 In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,126 Judge Edwards considered whether non-state 
actors might be held to the same “behavioral norms” as states.  In his concurrence, he noted: 
 
121 See MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (5th ed., 2004) (“National law is 
concerned primarily with the legal rights and duties of legal persons (individuals) within the 
body politic – the state or similar entity. . . . International law, at least as originally conceived, is 
concerned with the rights and duties of the states themselves. . . . [I]nternational law comprises a 
system of rules and principles that govern the international relations between sovereign states 
and other institutional subjects of international law such as the United Nations and the African 
Union.”).  See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769), 
cited with approval in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2756 (2004) (“Offenses 
against the law of nations are principally incident to whole states or nations.”). 
122 See SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1984). 
123 See, e.g., Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. 
Res. 3452, ¶ 30, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975) (Torture is an act inflicted 
or instigated by a public official and “[n]o state shall permit or tolerate torture. . .” and “[e]ach 
state shall . . . take effective measures to prevent torture . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
124 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1. 
125 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and 
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”); United 
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights 
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In the 19th century, the view emerged that states alone were 
subjects of international law, and they alone were able to assert 
rights and be held to duties devolved from the law of nations. . . . 
In this century . . . writers have argued that both the rights and 
duties of international law should be applied to private parties. . . . 
However, their discussions are more prescriptive than descriptive; 
they recognize shifts in firmly entrenched doctrine but are unable 
to define a clear new consensus.127 
After a thorough review of the historical grounds for liability under the law of nations, 
Edwards concluded that purely private individuals, i.e., those neither associated with nor acting 
under the color of any state, may not be held liable for violations of international law under the 
ATCA.128 However, Edwards did recognize a “handful” of historical exceptions permitting 
private liability for violations of international law, including piracy and slave trading.129 
Presciently, he added “I have little doubt that the trend in international law is toward a more 
expansive allocation of rights and obligations to entities other than states . . . .”130 
Judge Rymer of the Ninth Circuit echoed Edwards’ general state-action requirement in In 
re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation.131 There he stated, “Only 
individuals who have acted under official authority or under color of such authority may violate 
 
Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is also well settled that the law of nations is 
part of federal common law.”). 
126 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). 
127 Id. at 794. 
128 The District of Columbia Circuit Court adopted Judge Edwards’ finding in Sanchez-Espinoza 
v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985), concluding that customary international law 
does not reach private, non-state actions. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 795.  See also Dr. P.K. Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in 
International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 151 
(1992). 
131 In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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international law.”132 This principle has been adopted by several other courts and 
commentators.133 
This simple requirement was complicated somewhat after Argentine Republic v. Amerada 
Hess Shipping Corp. There, the Court held that the ATCA could not be used to obtain a forum 
in the district courts for an action against a sovereign nation or its agents acting in the scope of 
their official duties because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976134 was the sole basis 
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts.135 That decision, occurring as it did 
between Filartiga and Kadic, perhaps explains the recent popularity of suing MNCs.  MNCs end 
up as default defendants for conduct largely committed by the victim’s government.  Not only 
can those governments not be sued under the ATCA, but there are few international forums for 
victims of human rights abuses that permit suits by individuals against a state.  The International 
Court of Justice only concerns parties that are states.136 And it is not generally possible or 
practical for the victims of atrocities to seek redress in national courts for the acts of their 
government or of entities in which their government has a favorable interest.137 Furthermore, the 
 
132 Id. at 501-02.  See also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The 
[Kadic court] [] went on to state that although “acts of rape, torture, and summary execution,” 
like most crimes, “are proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or 
under color of law” to the extent that they were committed in isolation, these crimes “are 
actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they 
were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes.”). 
133 See, e.g., Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F.Supp.2d 14, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (“[A] private party may be 
liable for violations of the law of nations where the individual was acting as an officer of the 
state or under color of state law.”); Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F.Supp. 734, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(“Courts that have found causes of action to lie pursuant to § 1350, have done so when state 
actors violated the law of nations.”).  
134 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq. (2005). 
135 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989). 
136 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1. 
137 See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in pt., rev’d in pt.,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal 
dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (“According to plaintiffs, ‘[t]here is no functioning 
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states themselves are often protected by sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine or the 
political question doctrine.  Thus, victims go after those that they can, the MNCs.138 
The historical principle that state-action is required in order to attribute liability to an 
entity for an alleged violation of international law has been embraced by the federal courts.   Yet, 
the matter of what standard should be applied in order to determine whether this requirement has 
been satisfied is a work in progress among the circuits.  As a result, MNCs may be held liable 
under the ATCA in several ways depending upon the extent of their operations, their relationship 
with the host country, and the nature of the alleged violations. 
B.  The TVPA: State-Action Expressed. 
 The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) provides a private cause of action only for 
official torture and extrajudicial killing.  The law states: 
 An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or 
color of law, of any foreign nation – 
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable 
for damages to that individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil 
action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal 
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an 
action for wrongful death.139 
The TVPA requires the plaintiff to exhaust “adequate and available remedies” in the 
place the conduct occurred,140 imposes a ten-year statute of limitations,141 and, interestingly, 
 
judiciary in Burma and any suit against defendants would have been and would still be futile and 
would result in serious reprisals.  There is a pervasive atmosphere of terror and repression 
throughout the country.’”). 
138 The creation of the International Criminal Court may help relieve some of this pressure on the 
ATCA and MNCs. 
139 28 U.S.C. §1350 note § 2(a) (2005). 
140 Id. at § 2(b). 
141 Id. at § 2(c). 
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permits suits by U.S. citizens tortured abroad.142 Section Three provides definitions for “torture” 
and “extrajudicial killing.”143 
However, the act does not provide a definition for the term “individual.”  Where under 
the ATCA, courts have generally presumed MNCs may be held liable, this is not so under the 
TVPA.  The absence of a statutory definition for “individual” has created some difference of 
opinion among the district courts as to whether corporations may be held liable under the TVPA.   
Recently, in Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,144 Judge Rea of the Central District 
of California held that corporations are not “individuals” liable under the statue.145 In Mujica,
Occidental, an American company based in Los Angeles, operated an oil production facility and 
pipeline near the plaintiffs’ village of Santo Domingo as part of a joint venture with the 
Colombian government.  The plaintiffs, Colombian civilians, alleged that Occidental provided 
funding and practical support for a private security company and the Colombian Air Force 
(CAF) to engage in military operations aimed at protecting the corporation’s interests from left-
wing insurgents. During one such military operation, the private security company and the CAF 
allegedly dropped a cluster bomb on Santo Domingo, killing seventeen civilians.  The plaintiffs 
brought claims under the ATCA, the TVPA and California state law. 
Judge Rea based his holding solely upon a reading of the plain language of the TVPA 
done in a manner that would avoid an “‘absurd result.’”146 The statute describes one liable as an 
 
142 H.R. Rep. 102-367(I), at 4 (1991). 
143 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3(a), (b) (2005). 
144 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F.Supp.2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
145 Id. at 1176.  See also In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 55-56 
(E.D.N.Y 2005); Arndt v. UBS AG, 342 F.Supp.2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Friedman v. 
Bayer Corp., 1999 WL 33457825 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 
F.Supp 362, 382 (E.D. La. 1997). 
146 Mujica, 381 F.Supp.2d at 1176 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 
(1998)). 
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“individual” who subjects another “individual” to torture or extrajudicial killing.  Rea did “not 
believe it would be possible for corporations to be tortured or killed” or “to feel pain and 
suffering.”147 Rea grounded his construction on the principle that “terms should be construed 
consistently throughout the statute.”148 Thus, he found the plaintiff’s argument based on Clinton 
v. City of New York to be unpersuasive.  There the Court had held the term “individuals” to be 
synonymous with “persons” under the Line Item Veto Act, observing that “the term ‘person’ 
‘often has broader meaning in the law.’”149 Rea also noted he could not find any “pertinent 
legislative authority” in congressional committee reports.  Ultimately, however, Rea granted 
Occidental’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss pursuant to the political question doctrine. 
 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran provides another bit of helpful analysis in support of the 
rule that corporations are not “individuals,” and thus not liable, under the TVPA.150 There, the 
court also applied a plain-language interpretation of the statute.  Tom Beanal, and Indonesian 
citizen, brought several claims under the ATCA and TVPA against an American corporation 
headquartered in New Orleans that owned a subsidiary in Indonesia which operated open pit 
copper, silver and gold mines.  As part of its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Freeport asserted that 
the TVPA did not apply to corporations.  District Judge Duval began by analyzing the plain 
meaning of the term “individual” and noting that the term does not typically include a 
corporation.  The court cited Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary 
 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (citing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. 
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that 
identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”)). 
149 Id. (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 (1998)). 
150 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F.Supp 362 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d on other grounds,
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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as defining “individual” to mean a “single human being” and “single person” respectively.  
Duval relied on an Eleventh Circuit case in support of this finding.151 
Where Judge Rea avoided any “pertinent legislative history”, Judge Duval found that 
declining to apply the TVPA to corporations was “not at odds with congressional intent.”152 
First, there was no legislative history as to whether corporations may be held liable.  Second, the 
House Report states, “Only ‘individuals’, not foreign states, can be sued under the bill.”153 
Third, the Senate Report confirmed that the statute used the term “individuals” in order to make 
it clear that foreign states may not be sued, only “individuals.”154 Duval concluded from this that 
Congress purposely chose to use the specific term “individual,” and although Congress may not 
have intended to exclude corporations from liability, the TVPA clearly applies only to 
“individuals,” which Duval understands to mean natural persons and not corporations. 
 Despite the seemingly unimpeachable reasoning of Judges Rea and Duval, at least two 
other courts have come to the opposite conclusion.  In Sinaltrainal v. The Coca-Cola Co., the 
Southern District of Florida held that liability under the TVPA extended to corporations 
essentially because there was no evidence in the legislative history of a congressional intent to 
exempt corporations.155 The court provided three reasons.  First, the Senate Report explained 
that the purpose of the statute was to “permit suits ‘against persons who ordered, abetted, or 
assisted in torture.’”156 Second, the Senate Report did not mention any corporate exemptions and 
 
151 Jove Engineering, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the term 
“individual” as used in the bankruptcy code does not include corporations). 
152 Beanal, 969 F.Supp at 382. 
153 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 102-367(I), at 4 (1991)). 
154 Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 6 (1991)). 
155 Sinaltrainal v. The Coca-Cola Co., No. 01-3208, 2003 WL 1846195 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
156 Id. at 17 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 9-10 (1991)). 
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courts have held corporations liable for suits under the ATCA.157 Third, and unlike Judge Rea in 
Mujica, the court found the holding in Clinton v. City of New York to be persuasive.  Thus, 
because other areas of law generally view corporations as persons, if Congress had intended to 
exempt corporations from the TVPA it would have done so explicitly.  The district court for the 
Northern District of Alabama adopted this reasoning for its holding in Lacarno v. Drummond 
Co., Inc.158 
There are two significant differences between the TVPA and the ATCA.  First, the state-
action requirement is found expressly in the TVPA while it is only implicit in the ATCA as a 
hand-me-down from traditional notions of international law.  Second, the TVPA pertains to two 
clearly defined causes of action for torture and extra-judicial killing and so finds sources for 
standards of application in domestic law.  The ATCA, on the other hand, applies to an 
amorphous and expanding panoply of international law violations and so it is not limited to 
domestic sources, but may find the standards for application in international sources.  
Nonetheless, the TVPA’s legislative history perhaps warrants a broader cast of liability than the 
Mujica interpretation of “individuals” would indicate.  In its report, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee explained that the TVPA would permit suits “against persons who ordered, abetted, 
or assisted in torture.”159 In the Wiwa case, the Southern District of New York found that the 
language and legislative history of the Act supports liability for aiders and abettors.160 
Consequently, the ATCA and the TVPA share a common outer limit for MNC liability at “under 
color of law” and aider & abettor status for, regarding the latter Act, torture and extra-judicial 
 
157 Id. 
158 Lacarno v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
159 S. Rep. No. 249, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
160 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell, 2002 WL 319887, at 16 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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killing, and regarding the former Act, an amorphous and expanding catalog of horrors.161 Of 
course, the ATCA, pursuant to Kadic’s genocide exception, eschews the state-action/color of law 
standard completely for genocide, war crimes and international law violations committed in the 
course of genocide and war crimes. 
 
IV.  Aiding & Abetting Standard for MNC-Accomplice Liability and  
The Latent Jurisprudence of Unocal. 
While the federal courts have consistently embraced the state-action requirement in 
applying the ATCA and TVPA, they have employed several standards in order to determine 
whether a private corporation may be held liable for a State’s human rights violations.  Two 
important methods of holding MNCs liable are as direct actors via § 1983 “color of law” 
jurisprudence, or as third-party accomplices according aiding and abetting standards.  Because 
MNC’s are more likely to engage with foreign states as third-party violators, the aiding and 
abetting standard will be dealt with more thoroughly.  What is not clear, however, as is evident 
from the Unocal case, is against which aiding and abetting standard MNC behavior is to be 
gauged.   
As for § 1983 “color of law” liability, one theory as to its use as a source of ATCA 
liability relies on the notion that an ATCA claim, while based on an international law violation, 
 
161 The ATCA and TVPA also share a common statute of limitations.  Although the ATCA does 
not expressly mention one, several courts have borrowed the TVPA’s ten year period of 
limitations for ATCA actions.  See Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F. 3d 932, n.13 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en 
banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005), 
Papa v. United States, 281 F. 3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell, 
2002 WL 319887, at 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor 
Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. 
Supp. 2d 424, 462 (D.N.J. 1999); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1195-96 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).  But see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 191-93 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(applying Massachusetts’ statute of limitations to ATCA claims without considering applicability 
of the TVPA ten-year limitations period). 
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is actually a domestic claim.  “[T]the ATCA does not adopt wholesale all principles of 
international law.  Rather, it creates a domestic cause of action for violations of international 
law.”162 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, using the language of Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, has 
stated “It is unnecessary that international law provide a specific right to sue.  International law 
'does not require any particular reaction to violations of law. . . .  Whether and how the United 
States wished to react to such violations are domestic questions.'”163 The ATCA is a creature of 
domestic law.  “[A]bsent an international norm of what constitutes state action for the particular 
offense, domestic law may provide a reasonable source of guidance.”164 As a result, many courts 
have looked to domestic standards of liability by analogy in order to find that MNCs may be 
liable for certain violations under the ATCA. 
Kadic was perhaps the first court to utilize the “color of law” jurisprudence of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 as “a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action for purposes of 
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act.”165 The court held that “a private individual acts under 
color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with 
significant state aid.”166 The Kadic court held that the Serb villagers had sufficiently alleged the 
Radovan Karadzic had acted under color of law by claiming that he “acted in concert with the 
former Yugoslavia . . . .”167 
162 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  
163 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring) cited with approval in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). 
164 Nanda & Pansius, supra note 118 (emphasis added). 
165 Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 245.  See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
166 Id. (emphasis added).  See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
167 Id. (emphasis added). 
MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
 40
In Sosa, the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed the Second Circuit precedents since 
Filartiga and Kadic pertaining “color of law” liability and holding private corporations liable for 
jus cogens violations of international law under the “genocide exception” absent state action.  
The Court also affirmed the existence of aiding and abetting liability under the ATCA by quoting 
with approval Attorney General Bradford’s 1795 opinion that any person “committing, aiding, or 
abetting” attacks on the British would be “liable for punishment under the law of nations.”168 
However, the Court failed to articulate what standard should be applied in evaluating ancillary 
MNC liability. 
 Prior to Sosa, courts sought standards for the aiding and abetting liability of MNCs from 
four directions: civil, criminal, domestic and international.  The Unocal case, although dismissed 
pursuant to a settlement in 2005 before it could be reheard by the Ninth Circuit en banc, provides 
two useful examples of jurisprudence a federal court might utilize to hold an MNC liable under 
the ATCA, regardless of state action.  The two judge majority employed an international 
criminal standard borrowed largely from United Nation’s ad hoc tribunals.  The concurrence, 
alternatively, concluded that an ATCA action was one of the narrow fields appropriate for the 
application of federal common law because such actions often implicated United States relations 
with foreign states.  Furthermore, the concurrence found that the federal common law remedy 
was necessary in order to promote the Congressional policy underlying the ATCA.  The result of 
Unocal is to articulate at least three varieties of aiding and abetting liability possible under the 
ATCA: international criminal law, federal common law, or international criminal law as 
expressed, integrated and filtered by federal common law. 
 
168 1 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 57, 59 (1795).  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2759 
(2004).  See also Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1174 n.6 (S.D. 
Cal. 2005). 
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In the Unocal case, villagers from Myanmar brought an action under the ATCA against 
the American oil company Unocal Corp. alleging that it had aided and abetted the Myanmar 
military in the commission of human rights violations in order to facilitate the construction of a 
gas pipeline.169 More specifically, the villagers alleged they were subjected to forced labor, 
murder, rape, and torture.  The two-judge majority in Unocal looked to international criminal 
aiding and abetting standards in holding that the villagers had sufficiently pled violations of the 
law of nations under the ATCA. 
 First, applying the “specific, universal, and obligatory” international norm standard,170 
the majority held that torture, murder, rape, and forced labor were all jus cogens violations and 
thus violations of the law of nations.171 Second, the court held that since “forced labor is a 
modern variant of slavery” it is among those “handful of crimes” that do not require state action 
to give rise to ATCA liability.172 Furthermore, because the acts of rape, torture and murder were 
committed in furtherance of forced labor, a la Kadic’s genocide exception, state action is not 
required for such acts either.173 
With regard to the forced labor claim, the court held that a reasonable factfinder could 
find Unocal liable under the ATCA for aiding and abetting the Myanmar Military.174 The aiding 
 
169 See Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F. 3d 932, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 
978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). 
170 C.f. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004). 
171 Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 944-45. 
172 Id. at 946-47.  In so holding, the court relied on the following authorities: U.S. Constitution, 
Thirteenth Amendment (“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the 
United States.”); United State v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F. 3d. 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir.1995) (slavery 
constitutes a jus cogens violation); World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 
2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (implicitly including forced labor in the definition of ‘slavery’ for 
purposes of the ATCA); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (forced 
labor violates the law of nations). 
173 Id. at 954. 
174 Id. at 947. 
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and abetting standard the court applied was that of “knowing practical assistance or
encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”175 In so doing, the 
court chose to apply international law rather than the law of Myanmar or California. 
 To begin with, the court found that the District Court had erred in applying the “active 
participation” standard.176 The District Court had borrowed the standard from the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal cases involving German industrialists and the Nazi forced labor programs, 
where it had been applied in order to overcome the “necessity defense.”177 Unocal had not 
invoked that defense.  Nonetheless, the court agreed that international law as developed by 
international criminal tribunals contained the applicable substantive law.178 
The court admitted that it is an open choice of law question as to whether international 
law, the law of the state where the events occurred, or the law of the forum should be applied.179 
The court cited several domestic sources so as to hold that international law was the applicable 
law.  First, it found that in a case such as this where only jus cogens violations were alleged, 
 
175 Id. (emphasis added).  While not addressing alternative theories of liability, the court 
mentioned in dictum that joint venture, agency, negligence, and recklessness may be viable 
theories on the Unocal facts, and perhaps more appropriate in other ATCA cases.  Id. at 947 
n.20. 
176 Id. at 947. 
177 “Necessity is a defense when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid an evil both 
serious and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that the remedy 
was not disproportionate to the evil.”  Id. at 948 n.21 (quoting United States v. Krupp, 9 Trials of 
War Criminals Before  the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 
1436 (1950) quoting 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law 177 (12th ed. 1932)). 
178 Id. at 948. 
179 Id. (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F. 3d 88, 105 n.12).  See Xuncax v. 
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180-83 (D. Mass. 1995) (international law provides substantive law 
for ATCA cases); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 777, 781-82 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (forum’s tort law provides substantive causes of action); In re 
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 978 F. 2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (tort law of state where 
underlying events occurred); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (district 
court must perform traditional choice of law analysis to determine whether international law, 
forum law, or lex loci delicti should provide substantive law). 
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international law was preferable because, by definition, any state law is either identical to jus 
cogens norms, or it is invalid.180 Second, looking to foreign or state law for the cause of action 
“mutes the grave international law aspect of the [ATCA] tort, reducing it to no more (or less) 
than a garden variety municipal tort.”181 The court noted that the more crucial tension was 
between international law and Myanmar’s law (where the underlying events occurred).182 It 
implied this was because the law of nations had been absorbed into the federal common law and 
the federal common law was most likely to be the applicable forum law where the action arose 
under a federal statute.  Third, the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the ATCA creates a 
cause of action as well as confer jurisdiction.183 Fourth, the factors of § 6(2) of the Restatement 
(2d) of Conflict of Laws point to international law: (a) the needs of the international system 
would be better served by applying international rather than national law; (b) the relevant 
policies of the forum cannot be ascertained; (d), (f), and (g) the standard adopted dates back to 
the Nuremberg trials and resembles that in the Restatement (2d) of Torts; (e) the basic policy 
underlying the field of tort law is to provide remedies for violations of international law.184 
180 Id. 
181 Id. (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995)). 
182 Id. at 949 n.23. 
183 See Papa v. United States, 281 F. 3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002); Marcos II, 25 F. 3d 1467, 
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994).  C.f. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761 (2004) 
(“[A]lthough the [ATCA] is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the 
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have 
practical effect the moment it became law.  The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been 
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the 
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the 
time.”).  See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our 
law . . .”). 
184 Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 949. 
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Upon different facts, however, the analysis may result in the application of forum state’s law, 
federal common law, or the lex loci delicti.185 
Having found international law to be the applicable substantive law, the Unocal majority 
next held that standard of aiding and abetting liability under international criminal law was 
appropriate.  First, the distinction between criminal and tort law is not necessarily important:  
“[h]uman rights law has largely been developed in the context of criminal prosecutions . . . what 
is a crime in one jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdiction . . . and the standard for aiding 
and abetting in international criminal law is similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in 
domestic tort law . . .”186 Second, the trend among District Courts is to look to international 
criminal tribunals for human rights law standards under the ATCA.187 Consequently, the Unocal 
court found that recent decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were “especially 
helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it 
pertains to the ACTA.”188 
185 Id. at 949 n.25. 
186 Id. at 949. 
187 See Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002) 
(applying the statute and a decision of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (noting that the 
statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and their recent opinions are particularly relevant for determining 
international law norms as they apply to the ATCA). 
188 Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 949-50.  See also Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 880 (“The law of nations may be 
ascertained by consulting . . . judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.”).  The 
Unocal court denied that it was declaring the Furundzija aiding and abetting standard to be the 
controlling standard and so it was not bound by every aspect of the standard.  Rather, the 
tribunal’s decision was merely one of the sources of international law, but not the source of 
international law.  Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 951 n.28.  But see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 
700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it 
are duly presented for their determination.”). 
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The Unocal court relied principally on the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Furundzija and 
the ICTR case of Prosecutor v. Musema for the actus reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting 
under international law.189 The court noted that the Furundzija Tribunal had based its standard 
on an “exhaustive analysis” of international case law and international instruments.  The former 
consisted of decisions by American, British and German courts hearing cases of Nazi war 
crimes.  The latter consisted of the United Nation’s Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.190 The court 
observed that it “is hard to argue with the Furundzija Tribunal’s reliance on these sources” and 
the “Tribunal’s reliance on these sources again seems beyond reproach.”191 
With regard to the actus reus, Furundzija held “it requires practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.”192 Such “assistance” need not be a conditio sine qua non for the acts of the principal, but 
must merely make a significant difference.193 The MNC’s acts have a “substantial effect” where 
“the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in that same way without someone 
acting in the role that the accomplice [MNC] in fact assumed.”194 The Musema Tribunal 
similarly defined the standard as “all acts of assistance in the form of either physical or moral 
support that substantially contribute to the commission of the crime.”195 
With regard to the mens rea for aiding and abetting, Furundzija required “actual or 
constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the accomplice’s actions will assist the perpetrator 
 
189 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1 T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999); 
Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T (Jan. 27, 2000). 
190 Unocal, 395 F. 3d at 950-51 n.26, n.27 (citing Ferundzija at ¶¶ 192-234, 227). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 950 (quoting Furundzija at ¶ 235). 
193 Id. (citing Furundzija at ¶¶ 209, 233). 
194 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-1, ¶ 688 (May 7, 1997)). 
195 Id. (citing Musema at ¶ 126). 
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in the commission of the crime.”196 The MNC need neither share the mens rea of the principal, 
nor know the precise crime that the principal intends to commit.197 If the MNC is “aware that 
one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact 
committed, [the MNC] has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an 
aider and abettor.”198 Similarly, the Musema Tribunal required that the accomplice “[know] of 
the assistance he was providing in the commission of the principal offence.”199 It sufficed that 
he “knew or had reason to know” of the principal’s intent to commit the crime, though he did not 
have to share the same intent.200 
Finally, the court noted that the “assistance” and “encouragement” aspects of the 
Furundzija aiding and abetting standard are similar to that of U.S. tort law.  According to  
Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: “For harm resulting to a third person from 
the tortuous conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s 
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement [sic] to 
the other . . .”201 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Courts grant of summary judgment for 
Unocal and held that the MNC could be liable for the acts of forced labor, murder and rape, but 
not the acts of torture.  However, the court left the question of liability for providing “moral 
support” for another day.  Because there was sufficient evidence that Unocal gave assistance and 
 
196 Id. (citing Furundzija at ¶ 245). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 951 (citing Musema at ¶ 180). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979)).  See also id. at 951 n.28 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt.d (stating the “encouragement to act operates as a 
moral support”)). 
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encouragement to the Myanmar Military, it was not necessary to decide whether moral support 
alone would have been enough for liability.202 
Tort 
Claims 
Actus Reus 
“practical assistance or encouragement which 
has a substantial effect on the perpetration of 
the crime” 
Mens Rea 
“actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) 
knowledge that the accomplice’s actions will 
assist the perpetrator in the commission of the 
crime” 
Forced Labor Practical Assistance & 
Encouragement: 
- “hiring the Myanmar Military (MM) 
to provide security and build 
infrastructure along the pipeline route 
in exchange for money or food”203 
- “using photos, surveys, and maps in 
daily meetings to show the [MM] 
where to provide security and build 
infrastructure”204 
Substantial Effect: 
- “forced labor . . . ‘most probably 
would not have occurred in the same 
way’ without someone hiring the 
[MM] to provide security, and without 
someone showing them where to do 
it”205 
- Unocal Rep. Robinson: “our 
assertion that [MM] has not expanded 
and amplified its usual methods 
around the pipeline on our behalf may 
not withstand much scrutiny”206 
- Unocal Pres. Imle: “if forced labor 
goes hand and glove with the military 
yes there will be more forced labor”207 
- “the evidence does suggest that 
Unocal knew that forced labor was 
being utilized and that the Joint 
Venturers benefited from the 
practice”208 
- “Unocal knew or should reasonably 
have known that its conduct – 
including the payments and the 
instructions where to provide security 
and build infrastructure – would assist 
or encourage [MM] to subject 
Plaintiffs to forced labor.”209 
- Unocal V.P. Lipman: even before 
Unocal invested in the Project, Unocal 
was aware that “the option of having 
the [MM] provide protection for the 
pipeline construction . . . would 
[entail] [sic] that they might proceed 
in the manner that would be out of our 
control and not be in a manner that we 
would like to see them proceed,” i.e., 
“going to excess.”210 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 952, 952 n.29. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 952-53 (quoting Tadic at ¶ 688) 
206 Id. at 953. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part by Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
209 Id. 
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Murder & 
Rape (in 
furtherance of 
forced labor) 
Practical Assistance & 
Encouragement: 
- see Forced Labor 
 
Substantial Effect: 
- see Forced Labor 
- Unocal Consultant Haseman’s 
comment to Unocal: “the most 
common [human rights violations] 
[sic] are forced relocation without 
compensation of families from land 
near/along the pipeline route; forced 
labor to work on infrastructure 
projects supporting the pipeline . . . 
[and] execution by the army of those 
opposing such actions [sic].” 
- “Unocal knew or should reasonably 
have know that its conduct – including 
the payments and the instructions 
where to provide security and build 
infrastructure – would assist or 
encourage the [MM] to subject 
Plaintiffs to these acts of violence.”211 
- “[B]ecause Unocal knew that acts of 
violence would probably be 
committed, it became liable as an aider 
and abettor when such acts of violence 
– specifically, murder and rape – were 
in fact committed.”212 
Torture (in 
furtherance of 
forced labor) 
“The record does not, however, contain sufficient evidence to establish a claim 
of torture (other than by means of rape) involving Plaintiffs.  Although a 
number of witnesses described acts of extreme physical abuse that might give 
rise to a claim of torture, the allegations all involved victims other than 
Plaintiffs.  As this is not a class action, such allegations cannot serve to 
establish the Plaintiffs’ claims of torture here.”213 
The concurring Judge Reinhardt concluded instead that common law theories of third-
party liability ought to be applied rather than borrowing a doctrine from the ad hoc War Crimes 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.214 He found that the question of Unocal’s third-party tort 
liability “should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles, such as 
agency, joint venture, or reckless disregard.”215 
In order to prevail against Unocal for the policy of forced labor committed by the 
Myanmar Military (MM), the plaintiffs must prove that the private entity may be held legally 
responsible for MM’s human rights violations.  According to Reinhardt, this raises two issues of 
 
210 Id. at 954 n.32. 
211 Id. at 956. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 955. 
214 Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 977-78 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
215 Id. at 963. 
MNC Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
 49
first impression:  (1) “Under what circumstances may a private entity doing business abroad be 
held accountable in federal court for international law violations committed by the host 
government in connection with the business activities of the private entity [?]”;216 (2) “[T]o what 
body of law do we look in order to determine the answer?”217 
Regarding the body of law issue, Reinhardt ultimately concluded that federal common 
law was applicable based on Supreme Court precedents and the Restatement (Second)’s choice-
of-law analysis.  Reinhardt first noted that the face of the ATCA provides that the “law of 
nations” applies to determine whether a violation has occurred, but it is silent as to what law 
applies to ancillary issues, i.e. third-party liability.218 Instead of looking to international law, 
however, as the majority did, Reinhardt believed instead that the court was required to look to 
the federal common law to resolve “ancillary legal issues that arise in ATCA cases” for the 
following reasons.219 
The Erie case limited the applicability of federal common law to narrow circumstances 
(e.g., when authorized by Congress).220 However, in Texas Industries  v. Radcliff Material, the 
Supreme Court held that even without congressional authority, “the federal courts should apply 
federal common law ‘in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of 
the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States 
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.’”221 Reinhardt reasoned that because 
 
216 Id. at 965. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See generally Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
221 Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)) (emphasis added).  See also Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (“It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have 
rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.”) 
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ATCA claims always involve a violation of international law, they consequently very often 
implicate our relations with foreign nations.  He concluded that there are “unique federal 
interests involved in [ATCA] cases that support the creation of a uniform body of federal 
common law….”222 
The second reason Reinhardt gave for the applicability of federal common law is because 
in the case of the ATCA the federal courts “are required to resolve issues ancillary to a cause of 
action created by Congress.”223 The Supreme Court held in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 
that where Congress has created the cause of action, the courts should apply federal common law 
“to fill the interstices of federal legislation.”224 Thus, “federal common law is applicable where 
courts are required to implement the policies underlying a federal statute by fashioning 
appropriate remedies.”225 Here, it is necessary to apply federal common law in order to fashion 
an appropriate remedy with respect to the indirect involvement of third parties in the commission 
of a federal tort.226 
Reinhardt did not think that situations such that arise in this case are so rare that the 
courts must immediately surrender themselves to international law.  “The fact that some of the 
acts at issue here may have taken place abroad does not militate in favor of applying 
international law; transnational matters are litigated in federal court, using federal legal 
 
222 Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
223 Id. at 965-66. 
224 Id. at 966 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979)). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement with Reinhardt’s position.  In Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,
72 F. 3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996), it observed that the purpose of the ATCA is “to establish a 
federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to five effect to 
violation of customary international law.”  Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 966 n.4 (Reinhardt, J., 
concurring). 
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standards, more and more frequently as the pace of globalization grows ever more rapid.”227 
Reinhardt stated that the courts should not look to international law principles unless mandated 
by a statute or the existence of exceptional circumstances.228 Examples given for appropriate use 
of international law include interpreting the substantive provisions of the ATCA, the TVPA and 
certain provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.229 
Furthermore, Reinhardt found it necessary to distinguish between substituting 
international law for federal common law and merely using international law as a part of federal 
common law.  In the case of the latter, using federal common law does not mean a court must 
ignore a relevant principle of international law.  But in the case of the former, the court would 
lose the benefits of the “vast experience embodied in the federal common law” and use instead 
“an undeveloped principle of international law promulgated by a recently-constituted ad hoc 
international tribunal.”230 
Finally, Reinhardt concluded that federal common law was required pursuant to the 
choice-of-law inquiry of the Restatement (Second) section 6.231 First, “ease in determination and 
application of the law” is furthered by a well-developed body of federal common law rather than 
a criminal law standard recently decided in an ad hoc international tribunal.232 Second, 
“certainty, predictability and uniformity of result” are more likely where there are available 
precedents and the stability of the law is not threatened by possible future decisions of un-formed 
international tribunal created to deal with a unique regional conflict.233 Third, the “justified 
 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 967. 
231 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6 (1974). 
232 Doe I, 395 F. 3d at 967 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
233 Id. 
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expectations” of the parties are more likely to be met by applying the generally well-known 
federal common law principles of joint liability, agency, and reckless disregard.234 Fourth, 
because the policy of the ATCA is to “establish a federal forum where courts may fashion 
domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law,”235 
the “relevant policy of the forum” is to apply federal common law remedies.236 Finally, “the 
basic polic[y] underlying” the field of ATCA law is to “provide an appropriate tort remedy for 
certain international law violations.”237 Thus, the application of a tort standard of liability 
furthers the policy of using tort law to redress international violations while applying an 
international criminal law standard does not further that objective.238 Contrary to the majority, 
Reinhardt would not have the choice of law determination depend on the facts of each particular 
case.239 
Having concluded that federal common law was applicable, Reinhardt then discounted 
the possibility of applying the majority’s standard via the common law.  First, the ICTY standard 
adopted by the majority has not achieved sufficient international acceptance to constitute 
customary international law so that it may become part of the common law.240 And second, the 
ICTY’s standard is “far too uncertain and inchoate a rule for us to adopt without further 
elaboration as to its scope by international jurists.”241 For example, the “[m]embers of a future 
ad hoc tribunal elected by representatives of all of the nations that may then belong to the United 
Nations General Assembly might well define the term quite differently than does the majority 
 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 967-68. 
236 Id. at 968. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 969. 
240 Id. (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
241 Id. at 969-70. 
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here.”242 Reinhardt concluded his concurrence by then describing and applying the three 
applicable federal common law standards of liability that had been alleged by the plaintiffs: joint 
venture liability (i.e., Unocal and the Myanmar Military were joint venturers), agency liability 
(i.e., the Myanmar Military was acting as Unocal’s agent), and reckless disregard (i.e., Unocal 
recklessly disregarded the known risk that by hiring the MM, it would likely engage in human 
rights abuses to perform the duties Unocal desired it to fulfill in the pipeline construction).  
Although Reinhardt would have looked to federal common law for the appropriate standards of 
third-party liability, he nonetheless arrived at the same conclusion that Unocal could be found 
liable with the evidence as alleged. 
 The U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York aligned itself with the 
position of the Unocal majority in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy.243 In 
Talisman several residents of Sudan brought a class action under the ATCA alleging that the 
Canadian energy company had aided and abetted the Sudanese government in a policy of ethnic 
cleansing in order facilitate oil exploration activities.  The court dismissed Talisman’s motion to 
dismiss by finding that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that Talisman had aided and abetted 
with Sudan to commit jus cogens violations.  Like the Unocal majority, the New York court 
reached almost instinctively to international sources instead of looking first to U.S. concepts of 
aiding and abetting.  This result seems to be mostly a function of the substance of the allegations, 
i.e., jus cogens, of genocide, war crimes and torture.  The court stated: 
The ATCA provides a cause of action in tort for breaches of 
international law.  In order to determine whether a cause of action 
exists under the ATCA, courts must look to international law.  
Thus, whether or not aiding and abetting and complicity are 
 
242 Id. at 970. 
243 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The Talisman decision also presents an excellent 
review of much of the Second Circuit’s ATCA jurisprudence. 
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recognized with respect to charges of genocide, enslavement, war 
crimes, and the like is a question that must be answered by 
consulting international law.244 
The court then proceeded to cite several international criminal law sources of aiding and 
abetting liability, many of which had also been utilized by the Unocal majority, including:  the 
Statute of the International Military Tribunal, the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, the 
Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Prosecutor v. Musema, and Prosecutor v. 
Tadic.245 
The Supreme Court’s Sosa decision has served to reconfigure the trend articulated in the 
Unocal and Talisman courts’s aiding and abetting standard.  Even the U.S. District Court of the 
Central District of California recognized as much.246 The Sosa Court effectively signaled that a 
standard more aligned with Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence would fair significantly better than 
the majority’s if challenged before the high court.   
The Furundzija aiding and abetting standard applied by the Unocal majority (i.e., 
knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of 
the crime) would not pass must under the test for new causes of action for tortuous articulated by 
the Sosa court.  According to Sosa, new forms of liability must be “based on the present-day law 
of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have 
 
244 Id. at 320. 
245 Id. at 322-24.  See also Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1356 (N.D.Ga. 2002) 
(adopting the aiding and abetting standard of the ICTY and the Furundzija case) declined to 
follow by Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005). 
246 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in [Unocal] has arguably been altered by the Supreme Court’s more recent 
decision in Sosa.”). 
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recognized.”247 The Court assessed Alvarez’s claim for arbitrary detention in light of The 
Paquete Habana sources of international law: 
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, 
to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, 
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well 
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.  Such works are 
resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their 
authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy 
evidence of what the law really is.248 
First, the Sosa Court declined to accept two significant international sources as evidence 
that a cause of action existed for Alvarez’s arbitrary detention claim under the law of nations for 
ATCA purposes.  The Court found the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights did not create a formal rule of international 
law and had “little utility” under its standard.  The former was simply a declaration of principles 
and the latter was not self-executing and so did not create enforceable obligations in U.S. federal 
courts.249 
Second, the Court found that the rule Alvarez sought was far too broad to find sanction as 
a binding rule of customary international law.  Alvarez relied heavily on a survey of national 
constitutions and case from the International Court of Justice.  He failed to provide any evidence 
of foreign laws substantiating the type of arbitrary detention he alleged was prohibited under 
customary international law.  Also, the rule Alvarez sought was in direct tension with existing 
U.S. law.  Thus, Alvarez failed to produce specific evidence of the widespread use of the rule he 
asserted. 
 
247 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761-62 (2004). 
248 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
249 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767. 
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Likewise, the Unocal majority has failed to supply the requisite evidence of customary 
international law to support its application of a standard articulated by an ad hoc war crimes 
tribunal.  Judge Reinhardt’s pre-Sosa concurrence presciently described the difficulties with the 
majority’s standard.  First, “courts should not substitute [sic] international law principles for 
established federal common law or other domestic law principles … unless a statute mandates 
that substitution, or other exceptional circumstances exist.”250 Second, the Furundzija rule is too 
“uncertain and inchoate” to be considered a binding rule of customary international law.  And 
third, the rule adopted was articulated by an ad hoc international court created by an international 
organization of member states.  Customary international law, however, is the result of the 
consistent practice of states themselves, not of an international body.  As Reinhardt pointed out, 
such a standard is susceptible to redefinition by different members of a future ad hoc tribunal 
elected by the different representatives of the states that may then belong to the United Nations 
General Assembly at that time.251 Thus, the Unocal standard fails to meet the Sosa test for the 
law of nations under the ATCA, i.e., specificity, well-worn usage, and widespread international 
acceptance.   
V.  Conclusion. 
 The Alien Tort Claims Act has undergone a renaissance in the last ten years.  Foreign 
human rights victims have been compelled to obtain compensation and recognition through the 
ATCA due to the convergence of several factors, most notably the significant globalization and 
expansion of MNC activities in the last decade as well as the inability and unwillingness of 
States and supra-national organizations to close the “legal lacuna” in which such corporations 
operate. The Sosa Court managed to articulate a standard by which future ATCA litigants and 
 
250 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 966 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
251 Id. at 970. 
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judges might craft their remedies.  While it is unlikely the decision will stem the tide of litigation 
against MNCs for human rights violations, it has at least reigned in the more ridiculous attempts 
at creating broad standards of ex post facto liability.  The best way to protect local stakeholders 
involved in overseas MNC investment activities is to create workable and predictable parameters 
in which for them to operate.  Without predictability and specificity in the rules, whether based 
on the law of nations or a legal Lohengrin, it is unlikely that any person will be satisfied with the 
way corporations interact with foreign governments.  The Sosa Court affirmed the solid 
embankment the Second Circuit’s ATCA jurisprudence had built, and with little disruption, it 
managed to establish a breakwater to maintain that jurisprudence’s place on the U.S. shore 
against the unremitting surge of international law. 
 
